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In an earlier article in the ESR Review (Chenwi & Mbazira,2006) we indicated that governments were about to de-
cide on whether to proceed with the drafting of an optional
protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which will provide for a com-
plaints procedure. We also set out the historical background
and the debate about the need for the optional protocol.
tocol was prepared by the chairper-
son (UN doc A/HRC/7/WG.4/2 of 23
April 2007) and considered at the
fourth session of the OEWG held in
Geneva from 16 to 27 July 2007. It
was at this session that the first read-
ing of the draft occurred and com-
ments on it were received from states
parties, non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and individual experts.
This paper highlights some of the
positions of the delegates on certain
provisions of the draft optional pro-
tocol.
General remarks
In an opening address, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights,
Louise Arbour, noted that the adop-
tion of an optional protocol would be
an important step towards a greater
recognition of the indivisibility and in-
terrelatedness of all human rights.
She emphasised the importance of
strengthening the protection of ESC
rights through the optional protocol.
The draft optional protocol was
welcomed by most of the delegates,
including African countries such as
Egypt (on behalf of the African
Group) and South Africa. Other
states in support of the protocol in-
cluded Azerbaijan and Chile.
However, the United States of
America (USA) persisted with its argu-
ment that ESC rights are not as
justiciable as civil and political rights,
as the former cannot be adjudicated
without interfering in the internal
decisions of states. It added that,
because ESC rights have to be real-
ised progressively within available
resources, these rights are not suitable
for (quasi-)judicial adjudication. It
maintained that the optional protocol
would undermine the right of states to
determine their own policy priorities.
Specific provisions
Scope (art 2)
At the meeting, one of the most con-
troversial issues related to the rights
under the ICESCR that should be sub-
jected to the complaints procedure.
Various approaches were proposed:
a comprehensive approach, allow-
ing for communications in respect of
all rights in the ICESCR; a limited
approach, limiting the procedure to
Parts II and III of the ICESCR; and an
à la carte approach (with opt-out or
reservation provisions), allowing
states to choose the rights or levels of
obligations that they would like to be
bound by.
A large number of states sup-
ported a comprehensive approach
(Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso,
Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fin-
land, France, Guatemala, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Mexico, Nigeria, Nor-
way, Peru, Portugal, Senegal,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Swe-
den, Uruguay and Venezuela).
The debate on this issue has now
shifted from whether economic, so-
cial and cultural (ESC) rights should be
subject to a complaints procedure to
what the specific nature and
modalities of such a procedure should
be. During its 21st meeting, the UN
Human Rights Council (HRC) decided
to extend the mandate of the Open-
Ended Working Group on an op-
tional protocol to the ICESCR
(OEWG) for a period of two years in
order to elaborate on an optional
protocol (Resolution 1/3 of 29 June
2006, para 1). It requested the
chairperson of the OEWG, Catarina
de Albuquerque, to prepare a draft
optional protocol to be used as a
basis for future negotiations. It also re-
quested the OEWG to meet for ten
working days each year. It also di-
rected that a representative of the
Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (the Committee) should
attend these meetings as a resource
person.
Accordingly, a draft optional pro-
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France initially preferred an opt-
out approach but was later per-
suaded to support the comprehen-
sive approach. The NGO Coalition
for an Optional Protocol to the
ICESCR (the NGO
Coalition) continued







latedness of all rights
under the ICESCR.
Though generally in
favour of a compre-
hensive approach, Egypt added that
it would be able to accept the exclu-
sion of Part I of the ICESCR from the
optional protocol. In other words,
Egypt is also open to the limited ap-
plication of the complaints proce-
dure. Australia, Greece, India, Mo-
rocco, Russia and the USA were also
in favour of excluding Part I of the
ICESCR from the optional protocol.
States that favoured an à la carte
approach were Australia, China,
Denmark, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland,
the Republic of Korea, Russia, Swit-
zerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom
(UK) and the USA. They argued that
this approach would elicit wide ac-
ceptance of the protocol.
The UK preferred an opt-out ap-
proach, arguing that it would allow
states to sign on to more rights at a
later stage while not preventing
other states from subscribing to all
rights under the ICESCR. Poland, also
preferring an opt-out approach,
proposed that a minimum number of
articles should be established that all
state parties would have to accept.
The arguments for an opt-out clause
related to the non-justiciability of ESC
rights, the competence of the Com-
mittee and the difference in the situ-
ations of states. In other words,
states where ESC
rights have not yet
been made justici-










approach had some objections to
an opt-out or à la carte approach.
These included the fact that it would
establish a hierarchy among human
rights, undermine the interrelated-
ness of all rights in the ICESCR and
the interests of victims, foster inequal-
ity among review procedures within
the human rights monitoring mecha-
nisms and undermine the purpose of
the optional protocol to strengthen
the implementation of ESC rights (UN
doc A/HRC/6/8 at para 33).
Standing (arts 2 & 3)
Article 2 of the draft optional proto-
col gives standing to individuals or
group of individuals claiming to be
victims of a violation. It also allows
representative actions by NGOs or
other actors who may submit a com-
munication on behalf of victims, with
their consent.
Article 3 deals with collective
complaints, an issue that has not re-
ceived much attention in the discus-
sions of the OEWG. It grants standing
to “international” NGOs with con-
sultative status before the UN Eco-
nomic and Social Council to submit
communications alleging unsatisfac-
tory implementation by any state of
any right in the ICESCR (art 3(1)). Na-
tional NGOs with particular compe-
tence in the matters covered by the
ICESCR have standing only if, upon
ratification or accession, the state
party declares that it recognises the
right of such NGOs to submit collec-
tive communications against it (art
3(2)).
It should be noted that there is
some discrepancy between the Eng-
lish and Spanish versions of article
3(1). The English version uses the term
“international”, but the Spanish ver-
sion does not, hence granting stand-
ing to all organisations with consulta-
tive status. The NGO Coalition found
the English version to be particularly
problematic, as it excludes domestic
NGOs with consultative status. These
NGOs may be better placed to
lodge such communications because
of their proximity to victims of viola-
tions within the states in which they
operate.
The issue of having consultative
status as a criterion for standing was
the subject of concern by delegates
from Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, Ethio-
pia, Mexico and the NGO Coalition.
Since NGOs do have standing
under article 2 when acting in a rep-
resentative capacity for victims, there
was substantial consensus that article
3 should be deleted. The states that
called for its deletion were Algeria,
Australia, Belarus, Burkina Faso,
China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt,
Greece, India, Japan, Morocco, Ni-
geria, Norway, the Republic of Ko-
rea, Russia, Senegal, Tanzania, the
UK, Ukraine, the USA and Venezuela.
Another issue raised in relation to
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states were of the view that individu-
als must be allowed to give prior “ex-
press” consent before communica-
tions can be brought on behalf of
individuals or groups of individuals
(Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Morocco and Russia). How-
ever, Ecuador, Peru and the NGO
Coalition opposed this submission,
arguing that it might be difficult to
obtain express consent in certain
cases. As an alternative to requiring
express consent, Brazil, Chile, Portu-
gal and Uruguay proposed an ex-
ception to the consent requirement
where the author of the communica-
tion can justify acting on behalf of the
victim(s) without such consent. This
view was also supported by the
NGO Coalition.
Admissibility – exhaustion
of domestic remedies (art
4(1))
In previous sessions of the OEWG,
the need for clear admissibility crite-
ria similar to those of other human
rights instruments was highlighted. The
draft incorporates such admissibility
requirements.
Article 4(1) requires that all avail-
able domestic remedies should be
exhausted except “where the appli-
cation of such remedies is unreason-
ably prolonged or unlikely to bring
effective relief”. Some states found the
draft text acceptable (Argentina,
Belgium, Mexico, Slovenia and Swit-
zerland). Ecuador proposed that the
exhaustion of domestic remedies re-
quirement should not be applicable
when no such remedies have been
established in national legislation.
In previous sessions of the
OEWG, some states proposed the
inclusion of the requirement that re-
gional remedies must be exhausted
first before a complaint can be
lodged with the Committee. This pro-
position was restated during the
fourth session by the UK. This pro-
posal, though supported by some, did
not receive universal support. States
that opposed this submission argued
that it would prevent victims from ac-
cessing the system (Portugal, Argen-
tina, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Norway,
Peru and the NGO Coalition).
Interim measures (art 5)
All communication procedures make
provision for interim measures. The
draft optional protocol accordingly
includes a provision on interim meas-
ures so as “to avoid possible irrepara-
ble damage to the victim of the al-
leged violation”. The risk of such
damage has to be sufficiently sub-
stantiated.
Some states welcomed this provi-
sion (Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Egypt, France, Finland,
Liechtenstein, Mexico, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Uru-
guay and Venezuela).
Others proposed that
it should be included







be granted after a
communication has
been declared admis-
sible (Ecuador, Italy, India, New Zea-
land and Russia). However, other del-
egates opposed this view on the
ground that it could prevent victims
from obtaining timely, immediate re-
lief (the NGO Coalition, Argentina,
Belgium, Chile, Peru and Portugal).
The NGO Coalition pointed out
that, in its current form, the optional
protocol does not emphasise the ur-
gency of interim relief. It argued that
interim measures should be consid-
ered with urgency in order to protect
victims of violations, such as a mass
forced eviction, for example, who
should not have to await lengthy de-
liberative processes before remedial
action can be taken. This view was
also supported by Colombia and
Uruguay.
Friendly settlement (art 7)
A number of states were in support of
the inclusion of provisions encourag-
ing friendly settlement of disputes
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Den-
mark, Ethiopia, Finland, France
Mexico, South Africa, Spain, Swit-
zerland and Venezuela).
Some suggested that friendly set-
tlement should not be mandatorily re-
quired in every case (Argentina and
Mexico) or that it should only apply in
relation to interstate communications
in line with other human rights instru-




the USA were in sup-
port of the position in








the communication. However, Brazil
and Switzerland warned that no
communication should be closed be-
fore a friendly settlement had been
fully implemented. This is a point that
the NGO Coalition also empha-
sised. The coalition was of the view
that the friendly settlement procedure
must not prejudice consideration of
the communication in the event that
the agreement reached in a friendly
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settlement fails. This is so because the
success of a friendly settlement
mechanism depends on its ability to
protect the rights of victims whilst re-
taining the goodwill of the states
parties towards the international sys-
tem. The competence of the Com-
mittee to review friendly settle-
ments was supported by Denmark,
Finland and Spain, and opposed
by Australia, China, the USA and
Venezuela.
Mexico added that the Commit-
tee would need to follow up on the




Article 8(4) of the draft optional pro-
tocol makes reference to reasonable-
ness as the standard that the Com-
mittee would use for measuring
compliance by states with their obli-
gations under the ICESCR. This pro-
vision was welcomed by some states
at the fourth session of the OEWG
(Belgium, Chile, Finland, Germany,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Norway and Russia). The UK stated
that “reasonableness” actually re-
flects how states should implement
ESC rights and is an appropriate
standard of review.
The USA suggested a replace-
ment of the term “reasonableness”
with “unreasonableness” and the
addition of a provision that expressly
acknowledges that states have “the
broad margin of appreciation” to
determine how to use their resources
optimally.
The “unreasonableness” proposal
was supported by China, India, Ja-
pan, Norway, Poland and, surpris-
ingly, the UK, which had found the
“reasonableness” concept to be ac-
ceptable.
On the other hand, the NGO
Coalition and some states found it
rather restrictive (Egypt, Ethiopia, Por-
tugal and Slovenia) and felt that it
comes close to amending the
ICESCR (Belgium, Ethiopia, Mexico,
Portugal and Slovenia). This is be-
cause, the coalition argued, reasona-
bleness is implicit in the provisions of
the covenant as seen in the use of the
phrase “appropriate means” in arti-
cle 2(1).
The phrase “broad margin of ap-
preciation” received support from
Egypt, Norway, Poland and Swe-
den. However, some states pointed
out that this notion is already implic-
itly recognised in the ICESCR. They
argued that it is a flexible notion
whose application varies depending
on the specific context and the right
in question (Mexico and the NGO
Coalition). Russia, in an attempt to
reach a compromise, proposed that
the notion of “margin of apprecia-




Some states were opposed to includ-
ing interstate communications proce-
dure partly because states have
rarely brought communications
against each other. The same con-
cern was raised at the fourth session.
Other states wanted further clarity
and information on this procedure
from the Committee and other hu-
man rights treaty bodies.
Notwithstanding this scepticism,
the NGO Coalition and some states
supported retaining this procedure
(Egypt, France, Mexico, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, South Africa and
Spain). Egypt and Portugal pro-
posed that the procedure should be
made optional.
On the other hand, China submit-
ted that this procedure would under-
mine the principle of autonomy and
sovereignty of states. It therefore, to-
gether with Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ja-
pan, Norway and the UK, called for
its exclusion.
Inquiry procedure (arts 10,
11 & 20)
The inquiry procedure is generally
important as it allows supervisory
bodies to respond in a timely fashion
to grave or systematic violations. Ar-
ticles 10 and 11 of the draft optional
protocol make provision for such a
procedure. Article 20 gives state
parties the option to opt out of arti-
cles 10 and 11 at the time of signature
or ratification.
The NGO Coalition and several
states supported the inquiry proce-
dure (Austria, Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Finland, Liechtenstein,
Portugal, Senegal, South Africa and
Sweden). The NGO Coalition noted
that the procedure offers a means of
addressing grave or systematic viola-
tions of human rights which may not
be successfully resolved by individual
complaints. It also may resolve issues
that affect large numbers of people
who, for various reasons, may not
have access to the communications
mechanism.
Other states were sceptical of the
procedure and called for its exclusion
(Australia, China, Egypt, India, Italy,
R‘ussia and the USA). They argued,
amongst other things, that the proce-
dure is not practicable, interferes with
the sovereignty of states, and might
overburden the optional protocol.
Protection of individuals
(art 12)
Article 12 requires a state party to
“take all appropriate steps to ensure
that individuals subject to its jurisdic-
tion are not subjected to ill-treatment
or intimidation as a consequence of
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communicating with the Committee”.
This provision is identical to article 11
of the Optional Protocol to the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against
Women. It was a surprise inclusion as
it had not been discussed in previous
sessions of the OEWG.
This provision was supported by
Chile, Egypt, France, Mexico, Portu-
gal, South Africa, Switzerland and
Amnesty International. In fact, many
delegates argued for the inclusion of
a provision that would obligate states
to protect individuals from “any form
of reprisal” or “victimization of any
form” (UN doc A/HRC/6/8 at para
119).
International cooperation
and assistance (art 13) and
the fund (art 14)
Article 13 of the draft optional proto-
col requires the Committee, if it con-
siders it appropriate, to convey to UN
specialised agencies, funds, pro-
grammes and other competent bod-
ies its view on communications or
inquiries which require technical ad-
vice or assistance.
Article 14 proposes the establish-
ment of a fund to support the imple-
mentation of recommendations of
the Committee and to benefit victims
of violations of the rights in the
ICESCR. The fund would be fi-
nanced through voluntary contribu-
tions made by governments, intergov-
ernmental organisations, NGOs and
other private or public entities (art
14(2)).
There was some support for arti-
cle 13 (Argentina, Austria, Australia,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia,
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK).
Although Argentina, Belarus, Ger-
many, Slovenia and Ukraine sup-
ported the establishment of the fund,
most developed states opposed the
idea because it was not clear who its
beneficiaries would be and what it
would be used for. It was also argued
that the idea was impractical and
would duplicate existing efforts (Aus-
tria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Liechtenstein, New Zealand,
Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK
and the USA).
The African Group, together with
China, Belarus, India, Nepal and
Peru, wanted articles 13 and 14 to be
merged and proposed the deletion
of the words “special” and “volun-
tary” in those provisions. China and
Egypt added that deleting the word
“voluntary” did not mean that contri-
butions to the fund would become
mandatory. States that supported
the proposal that the fund, if created,
should be based on voluntary contri-
butions included Argentina, Guate-
mala, Italy, Mexico, Slovenia and
Ukraine.
The need to develop criteria for
deciding which states could receive
resources from the fund was high-
lighted by the Netherlands and
Ukraine.
Reservations (art 21)
Article 21 of the draft optional proto-
col prohibits reservations.
Greece, Poland and Turkey were
of the view that the protocol should
be silent on reservations and leave
the issue to be determined in accord-
ance with the applicable principles
of international law. Argentina, Bel-
gium, Chile, Finland, Germany,
Mexico, Portugal, South Africa, Ven-
ezuela and the NGO Coalition were
against the possibility of reservations,
arguing that reservations were in-
compatible with the complaints
mechanism and have been excluded
from recent human rights instruments.
Australia, Germany, Italy and the
UK cautioned against the use of res-
ervations to limit the scope of the
optional protocol. Likewise, Egypt and
China stated that reservations would
not be used to limit the scope of the
rights enforceable through the com-
plaints procedure but only to clarify
how a state would go about imple-
menting its obligations under the pro-
tocol. Denmark added that more
states would ratify the protocol if res-
ervations were allowed.
Conclusion
The optional protocol is a valuable
initiative as it will bolster the protec-
tion of and enhance the understand-
ing of ESC rights. Once adopted, it
will put an end to the unequal protec-
tion of human rights in international
law. The protocol should therefore
follow a comprehensive approach
just like any other existing UN com-
plaints mechanism, by widening its
application to all the rights and duties
enshrined in the ICESCR.
The debate held during the fourth
session suggests that the à la carte or
opt-out approaches could fall away
with time. NGOs, policy-makers and
other stakeholders have an important
role to play to ensure that a compre-
hensive and effective protocol is
adopted.
Lilian Chenwi is a senior
researcher in the Socio-Economic
Rights Project and a member of the
Steering Committee of the NGO
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Book summary
This book provides an analytical framework for determiningthe content of socio-economic rights. It transcends several
disciplines including philosophy, jurisprudence, human rights
and public policy.
BOOK SUMMARY
David Bilchitz, 2007. Poverty




The first part of the book considers
the normative foundations of socio-
economic rights. A philosophical
theory of rights is developed that pro-
vides a common foundation for both
civil-political rights and socio-eco-
nomic rights. It argues that fundamen-
tal rights are grounded in the princi-
ple of equal importance, which
requires protection for certain signifi-
cant interests that creatures have.
Among these central interests of indi-
viduals are two thresholds of urgency.
The first threshold is the interest
that people have to be free from
general threats to survival. The second
is the interest that people have to live
in an environment where they can
fulfil their purposes and live well.
The book draws an important dis-
tinction between conditional rights
rooted in the principle of equal im-
portance and unconditional obliga-
tions that require an engagement
with competing normative and prag-
matic considerations. Determining
the unconditional obligations of a so-
ciety requires an “all-things-consid-
ered judgment” concerning the state
of affairs that would best guarantee
the equal importance of individuals.
It thus becomes important to consider
who makes these final, complex judg-
ments. Though not the focus of the
book, an argument is made as to why
in certain circumstances it is justifiable
in a democracy for the judiciary to
make such decisions.
The second part of the book
moves from a philosophical discus-
sion to approaches to interpreting
socio-economic rights. It identifies
two current ways in which courts
have approached these rights: the
“reasonableness approach” and the
“equality” approach.
The “reasonableness approach”
was developed by the South African
Constitutional Court. It requires the
government to justify its actions ac-
cording to the standard of “reasona-
bleness”. The book argues that this
standard is defective for two reasons.
Firstly, it limits the scope for the nor-
mative development of socio-eco-
nomic rights. The distinctive role of
rights is not simply to draw attention
to the lack of a justification for gov-
ernment policy but to expose a par-
ticular type of failure: the failure to
address adequately certain vital in-
terests that people have. The focus
on the abstract and procedural no-
tion of “reasonableness” tends to
obscure the vulnerabilities of individu-
als in particular cases and enables
courts to abdicate their responsibility
to give substantive meaning to socio-
economic rights.
Secondly, the author argues that
the reasonableness approach is in
fact incoherent. It depends on evalu-
ating the justifiability of the link be-
tween policies that are adopted and
ends that are constitutionally en-
dorsed. In so doing, it enables courts
to test the constitutionality of state
policies against broad and constitu-
